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CASE COMMENTS
TO Do
CORPORATIONS--PERMIT
CORPORATIONS-FoREIGN
BusINEss.-The Logan-Pocahontas Fuel Co., a corporation organized under the laws of the state of West Virginia, made a
contract with the owner of the Camp Mining Co., whereby the
Camp Mlining Co. agreed to let the plaintiff have its entire output from April 1, 1916 to March 31, 1917. The contract was
partially made in Kentucky and was finished in Ohio and later
approved by the directors of the plaintiff company in W. Va.
The contract was made for the purpose of supplying customers
of the plaintiff outside of the state of Kentucky. The Camp
Mining Co. sold'a large amount of coal to other companies during the period from April 1, 1916 to March 31, 1917. This
action was brought against H. N. Camp for damages based on
the profit the plaintiff would have made on -thecoal which Camp
sold to the other companies. The defendant pleads that the
plaintiff was doing business in violation of sec. 571 of the Ken.
tucky Statutes in regard to the appointment of an agent upon
whom service of process could be made and etc.
The court held that sec. 571 of the Kentucky Statutes did
not apply here. The plaintiff was a foreign corporation engaged
in selling coal in different states. It had no business in Kentucky;" It merely purchased the output of a mine with the view,
as the evidence concedes to show, of selling the coal to customers
in other states." This was a transaction which should be governed by interstate commerce.
It is clear, according to the authorities that this is a case of
interstate commerce. "Interstate commerce consists of intercourse and traffic between citizens and inhabitants of different
states, and not only includes the transportation of persons and
property -and the navigation of public waters for that purpose,
Barnhard
but also the sale and exchange of commodities."
Bros. & Spindler v. Morrison, 87 S. W. 376. It is pretty well
taken that a person dealing in goods which are subject to commerce, who does business in one state can solicit in other states
without being embarrassed by being required to take out license,
establish resident agencies, or file certificates required by the
laws of the domestic states. Miller v. Goodman, 91 Tex. 41, 40
S. W. 718; Commonwealth v. Hogan, 74 S. W. 737; Breman v.
Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. Ed. 719; Stone v. State, 17 Ga.
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292, 43 S. E., 740. Where a coal company incorporated in
Pennsylvania shipped coal into New Jersey and there docked it
for the purpose of selling it in other states, the court held it
was interstate commerce. State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. Law (10
Vroom) 35. From the authorities cited it can be seen that the
principal case agrees with the general rule. Logan-Pocahontas
J. B. N.
Fuel Co. v. Camp, 246 S. W. (Ky.) 433.
IN
NEWSFOR VOTE
BONDS-ADVERTISEMENT
COUNTY
PAPER.-If a county advertises for the sale of road bonds, complying with, all statutory provisions except advertisement in
newspapers, when no newspaper is published in the county,
and none is shown to be of general circulation; it was held the
advertisement is valid without compliance with the latter provision.
The law never expects nor requires an impossibility. Where
the county has no newspaper published within the county nor
one of general circulation, then a strict compliance with the
statute would deprive that county of good roads, and hence,
would be a gross wrong to the citizens of the county.
The section of Carroll's Statutes, See. 4307, herein construed, was enacted by the General Assembly in 1914, in order to assist counties in .building roads and bridges. It would be preposterous to have the intent of the Legislature defeated by a strict
construction of this statute, thereby defeating the very purpose
of assisting the less wealthy counties.
The onstitutionulity of the Act was decided in the case of
Mitchell v. Knox Co. Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543. In this case
the court held the Act did not violate Sec. 177 of the Constitution, prohibiting the Commonwealth from constructing highways, nor 181a, which provides that the General Assembly cannot impose a tax for the purpose of any county.
Upon the particular question of failure to advertise in a
newspaper there has been no former ease decided, but in the case
of Billington v. Moore, 168 Ky. 22, the court holds that the
notice as required by S~e. 4307, is mandatory and must be substantially complied with. In this case the newspaper was weekly
and the advertisement appeared for five consecutive weeks before
the election.
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After the election is held, Houston v. Boltz, 169 Ky. 640,
holds that the Fiscal Court under 4307 has no discretion in the
matter but must issue the bonds and mandamus will lie to compel
it to do so. Under authority of the case under discussion, that
phrase referring to advertisement in a newspaper, is directory
and not mandatory, and in counties where there is no newspaper
of general circulation no advertisement in any newspaper is
necessary to the validity of the bonds when all other requirements are complied with. Harrison v. Jackson County Fiscal
J. S. C.
Court, 197 Ky. 57. Decided Dec. 15, 1922.
Op WARRANTY.-An ordinary action
alleged to be due for a breach of
$800.00
was filed to recover
warranty of a deed executed and delivered to the plaintiff by
the defendants, whereby they conveyed to him a lot in West
Virginia, upon which there was a stone building. The lot was
described as so many feet wide and so many feet deep, but it was
intended that all the land upon which the building, including its
foundation stood, should pass. By mutual mistake all the land
intended to be conveyed was not properly described. The building protruded four inches on the adjoining lot and the plaintiff,
in order to avoid threatened litigation, adjusted the matter with
the owner of the adjoining lot, 'by paying him $800.00, for which
amount he brings this action, and asks to have the deed reformed
so that it will conform to the intention of the parties.
COVENANTS-BREACH

The lower court sustained a demurrer to the petition, because it was brought as an ordinary action, when it should have
been brought in equity. Such an irregularity is not a ground
for sustaining a demurrer, but is sufficient to authorize the court
to transfer the cause to the proper docket. This question arose
in Cecil v. Kentucky Live Stock Insurance Co., 165 Ky. 211,
when an ordinary action was brought on an insurance policy
which the petition sought to reform on account of certain matters being left out by mutual mistake of the parties. The lower
court sustained a demurrer to the petition but it was held upon
the return of the case, if the plaintiff so desired, he should be
permitted to have the case transferred to the equity docket upon
an amendment of his petition, so as to seek equitable relief.
The covenant sued on is a real covenant and runs with the
land, and the remedies thereon are necessarily governed by the
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laws of the state wherein the land is located. In Kentucky a
recovery for breach of warranty of title cannot be had without
showing prior eviction. In Walker v. Robinson, 103 Ky. 618,
where the grantee failed to allege -an eviction by judicial proceedings and determination thereof, a demurrer to his complaint
for breach of covenant was properly sustained. Hunter v. Keitley, 148 Ky. 835, -holds accordingly. Therefore, if the action
were to be governed by Kentucky law, the complaint would be
demurrable but as West Virginia follows the view that such an
action can be maintained -without a prior eviction, the case was
sent back, judgment to be rendered for whomsoever the evidence
should authorize. Harrisv. Music, et al., 197 Ky. 114. J. W. C.
CRImINAL IAW-ONE 'ACCUSED OF IMISDEMEANOR

M iY

BE

TRIED IN His ABSENCE.-A deputy sheriff informed the defend-

ant upon arresting him that his trial would be heard on the 5th
day of the approaching term of court.
The defendant gave
bond and having no other information as to the day set for a
hearing of his trial, relied on the statement of the deputy sheriff
and was absent from his trial which was held on the 3rd day of
the term. At this trial the defendant was found guilty. On the
5th day of the term the defendant appeared and filed his motion
and grounds for a new trial and in support thereof filed his affidavit setting forth the above facts. His motion was overruled
and he prosecutes this appeal.
As a general rule, in cases of felony, the presence of the de:
fendant at the trial must appear from the record, Harris v.
People, 130 Ill. 457; Peters v. U. S., 94 Fed. 127, and generally
such presence cannot be presumed. A failure of the record thus
to show the presence of the defendant during the trial will work
a reversal of the judgment of conviction.
In misdemeanor cases, particularly where the punishment
may be by .imprisonment, defendant has a right to be present
during the trial, and a trial and conviction in his absence is invalid, Payne v. Commonwealth, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 839; Sharp v.
Commonwealth, 30 S. W. 414, unless he may and does waive his
right to be present. Since the defendant has an absolute right

CASE COMMENTS

to be present throughout his trial, any proceedings had during
his involuntary absence constitute grounds for a new trial. Payne
v. Commonwealth, 30 S. W. 416; Cole. v. State, 10 Ark. 318;
People v. Yut Ling, 74 Cal. 569.
The court, in deciding this case, said: "In the matter of
granting new trials the circuit court possesses a broad discretion,
Baker v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 847.'" But they reversed the
ruling of the circuit court in this case on the ground that there
was an abuse of the discretionary power of the court in such
matters. It is well established in this state that where the defendant is absent from his trial on a misdemeanor charge and it
clearly appears that the defendant's absence was involuntary
and an unavoidable casualty -and misfortune against which he
could not have provided, it is the duty of the court to sustain a
motion for a new trial. Lakes v. Commowealth, 197 Ky. 287.
January 16, 1923.
T.E. S
DAMAGES, PERSONAL INJURIES, PROXIMATE CAUSE AND EvI-

DENCE.-Appellant's husband carried two small insurance polities with the defendant Insurance Company. These policies had
an exchange value of $83.76. In June, 1920, he exchanged these
policies for a straight life policy of $1000.00. The exchange
value of the policy lacked $4.16 of paying two years' premium on
t.he life policy, but the policy was indorsed on the margin for one
year's premium. The Company claimed that the remaining
$4.16 must be raid before they could indorse it for the two years'
payment. It also contended that the holder must sign a release
of the exchange policies. There was some controversy in regard
to these matters and in June, agents of the Insurance Company
went to the residence of the insured to adjust the matter or
secure the policy. Insured was asleep and they asked appellant
to give them the policy. She refused to surrender the policy,
but got it and held it in her hand to show them the number of it.
One of the agents took it from her hand and refused to give it
back to her on her repeated requests. He said "we have got it
and we are going to keep it." Thereupon the agents hastily
retraced their steps and hurried dc,wn the street. Appellant
then ran into the house calling her husband and then ran down
the street calling and screaming to the agents to stop. She
pursued them for nearly a block and becoming exhausted, fell
to the street and thereby received serious injuries.
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The sole question raised by this appeal is whether or not
the acts of the agents were the proximate cause of the injuries.
The court holds that, since no threat was made nor anything
said or done to frighten and thereby cause her to run and fall,
the question must be answered in the negative. It held that
they did nothing to cause her to follow them and that a voluntary
act on her part intervened between the wrongful acts of the
agents -and the fall; therefore the injuries were due to her
actions.
This question was before the Kentucky court in Lexington.
Utilities Co. v. Parker'sAdmr., 166 Ky. 81. Here the rule followed was if the acts of the injured were "instinctive and innocent," the injured party could recover. In the case of Beiser
v, C., N. 0. N T. P. By. Co.. 152 Ky. 522, -it is held, "the mere
fact that a person is in an improper position, when if he had not
been there, no damage would have resulted, does not preclude
him from recovering such circumstance is only a condition to the
happening of the damages, not a cause of it."
The fact that the appellant should become excited and run
after the agents after they had wrongfully obtained possession
of her property is, it seems to the writer, "instinctive and innocent." Again, if she was in -an improper position, due to the
conduct of the agents, such a circumstance is only a condition to
the happening -of the damage, not the cause of it. Therefore, it
seems by the application of the above rules, the wrongful acts of
the agents were the proximate cause of the injuries to the appellant.
The original act being wrongful, and those that intervened
being but the natural consequences of such an act, it does not
appear that the Kentucky rule, as laid down in the above cases
was followed in the principle case. Clifford v. MetropolitanLife
Insurance Company, 197 Ky. 828. Feb. 20, 1923.
R. 0. S.
DEEDS--DuREss-VoiD

IN

EQuITY.-Appellant, a trusted

employee of -amercantile company, confessed that he had been
stealing money from the cash register of the corporation for a
nunmber of years. In order to avoid prosecution and imprisonment for the crime he was induced to convey to the company
certain realty which was estimated to be worth -about what he
had embezzled during the years of his employment, held a valid
conveyance.
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There can be no question raised as to the adequacy of consideration fer the compromise here made, because, as was held
in Cruety v. Heil, 89 Ky. 499, "the consideration cannot be inquired into if there is something of detriment to one party or
benefit to the other, however slight." But it is a well settled
principle of law that an agreement not to prosecute is illegal
and void. Of course, in this case, the mercantile company did
not expressly promise not to prosecute the appellant if he would
convey property equal in value to the money embezzeled, yet
it could no doubt be implied from their actions. However, even
if the agreement was illegal and void, the court would not set
aside the conveyance. In Kirnbrotgh v. Land, 11 Bush 556, the
court said, "If money is paid upon an illegal contract, the courts
will not aid in recovering it back, they will leave both parties in
the exact position in which they have placed themselves."
Then the remaining question and the one on which the appellant relies most to have this conveyance set aside is that of
duress. As a general rule contracts entered into in order to
avoid arrest .and imprisonment are voidable. Bane v. Detrick,
52 Ill. 19; Guilleaune v. Rowe, 94 N. Y. 268; and Hullhorst v.
Scharner, 15 Neb. 57. But the law does not permit a criminal
who has stolen money to avoid payment of the same on the
ground that debt was created through fear of imprisonment, for
there is no illegality or duress in demanding payment from the
thief of what he .has stolen, and in refusing to set aside this conveyance the court was in accord with the majority opinion of
other jurisdictions, such as: Breath v. Chapoton, 115 Mich. 506;
Thorn v. Pinkhon, 84 Me. 101; Holt v. Agnew, 67 Ala. 30; and
in Bodine v. Morgan, 37 N. J. 426; where it was held "the threat
to arrest him for his unlawful appropriation of their goods and
orders to his own use unless he should indemnify them, constituted, if it was made, no duress, and if the mortgage had been
given under the pressure of such a threat, it would not have affected its validity." Posey v. Lamb ert-Grisham Hardware Co.,
C. M. C. P.
197 Ky. 373. January 23, 1923.
EVIDENCE-CERTIFICATION

OF A

BIL--ENTRMS

IN

THE

JOURNALS--WHEN ACCEPTED AS CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE.-A mo-

tion was made before the Franklin circuit court to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain the members of the election
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commission and the clerk of the county court from putting into
operation the provisions of chapter 138 Session Acts 1922, or
exercising any of the duties imposed upon them under that chapter which is ordinarily called the registration law. The injunction was denied.
On appeal the question arose whether or not the court would
go behind the certification of the act by the presiding officers of
the two houses of the assembly, to consider the regularity of its
passage. Held: first, that it is well established in this jurisdiction that when an enrolled bill has been attested by the presiding
officers of each house respectively as section 56 of the Constitution
requires, it will be accepted by the courts as the actual bill
which was passed. The courts will not go behind the certification to determine whether all the requirements of the Constitution have been complied with in the passage of the bill; nor will
they look to the entries in the journals to determine that fact;
nor allow such entries t6 overthrow the presumption that the
steps taken in the passage of the bill were regular and in conformity to the constitutional requirements; second, that when a
bill thus. certified has been disapproved by the governor and returned to the house in which it originated, section 88 of the
Constitution governs. When this is the case it will be observed
that no certification is required by the presiding officers of the
houses; nor is any one required to sign the bill in any way. The
journals are required to show the proceedings of both houses,
and there is no evidence of the fact that the bill has become a
law, except the contents of the journals. They must necessarily
be looked to, to establish the truth and the facts, and they thereby
become competent evidence as to what occurred. The injunction
was granted on other grounds.
The first rule of law laid down by the court in this case
seems to be well established in this state and consistent with the
holdings of the courts in many other jurisdictions. Lafferty v.
Huffman, 99 Ky. 80, 1896, held that when a bill is attested by the
presiding officers of the two houses of the general assembly as required by law, it can not be impeached by the journals of these
houses, and must be accepted by the courts as the bill adopted
by the legislature and -as conclusive of the regularity of the steps
taken in its passage. Commonwealth. v. Shelton, 99 Ky. 120;
Commonwealth v. Hardin County Court, 99 Ky. 188; Duncan v.
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Conles, 131 Ky. 330; Vagt v. Beauchamp, 153 Ky. 64; Helm v.
Day, 134 N. Y. Supp. 770; Atchinson v. State, 28 Okl. 94; Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 177; Knox v. State., 62 Tex. Cr. R.

512.
The second rule laid down by the court, that when a bill is
passed over the govepnor's veto, the courts will look to the entries in the journals of each house for conclusive evidence as to
the regularity of the bill, is followed by many of the states.
Purdy v. People, 4 Hill 382; Rumsey v. New York and N. E. R.
Co., 130 N. Y. 88; State v. Price, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. R., 25; Hunt v.
State, 22 Tex. App. 396; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449; In re
Week's Estate, 96 N. Y. 876; People v. Teddy, 53 Colo. 109;
Webb v. Carter,129 Tenn. 182; Boll v. Sims, 215 S.W. 659. For
other cases in point see Dee, Dig., Statutes, See. 285.
Therefore, the general xule seems to be, that the courts will
accept the certification of the bill by the presiding officer of each
house as conclusive evidence, unless it was vetoed; then the entries in the journals kept by each house will be accepted as conclusive evidence. Perkins v. Luas, 197 Ky. 1. 1922. 0. W. C.
EVIDENOCE--CoRPORATIONS-ADMIsIONS

BY

OFFICER-COm-

suit for damages for the breach of a contract
the appellant, the plaintiff below, sought to introduce as an admission of the appellee corporation, a statement made to one,
Edelen, by Beam one of the defendants below and the superintendent and general manager of the appellee corporation. The
statement was made to Edelen while Beam was at his home and
off duty.
Narrative statements of an agent of a corporation are not
admissible against the principal. This rule is accepted and supported almost universally, Goetz v. Kansas City Bank, 119 U. S.
551; Vicksburg, etc., B. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99; W. T.
Smith Lumber Co. v. McLain,79 S.370; Williams v. Elrod, 128
Ark 207; Silveira v. Iverson, 128 Cal. 187; Baier v. Selke, 211
Ill. 512; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Sinclair, 171 Ky. 562; Ballard,
etc. Stone. Co. v. Durr, 165 Ky. 632. But as a corporation, like
an individual, may make admissions after the event, and as a
corporation can act only by its agents, the general officers or
agents of a corporation may affect it by statements subsequent
to the event, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Yopst, 118 Ind. 248;
PETENCY.-In a

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

Costigan v. Michael Transportation Co., 38 Mo. A. 219. Provided, but not unless, they are within the scope of the powers of
the declarant, Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Lee, 154 Ky. 256; Shelbyville Water Co. v. McDade, 122 Ky. 629, and were made in connection with his official duties, Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky
Heating Co., 142 Ky. 253; Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co.,
195 Ky. 478.
Applying this well established rule to the facts of this case.
Edelen was an old friend of Beam and went to his house on an
errand, while there Beam remarked that they had sold Ehremann 500 barrels of whiskey. Beam was an official of the appellee company with general powers, but this statement was not
made in the official discharge of his duties, nor was it in the
scope of his authority, because Edelen had not, and had no intention of doing business with the corporation, either to buy
from it or sell to it. The court layed down the rule that the declarations of agents of corporations are binding on the corporations only when made in the course of, or in connection with, the
performance of their authorized duties. This rule has been followed consistently by the Kentucky courts since the decision in
the case ol Clay v. Swett, decided in 1815 and reported in 4
Bibb 255.
Officers of a corporation are mere agents and their declarations are binding upon it only when made in the course of, or
in connection with, the performance of their authorized duties.
Ehremann, et al.-v. Old F. G. Walker Distillery Company, 197
Ky. 244. January, 1923.
T. E. S.
INPANTS-NExT

FRiEND.-When the next friend, for the

infant, agrees to a compromise in an action for personal injuries
done to the infant, and collects a monetary consideration through
an attorney, the infant may repudiate; the next friend is
only authorized to bring and prosecute such an*action, and has
no authority to collect any amount so recovered, nor has he any
authority to compromise, settle or adjust a claim of the infant.
Infants are peculiarly -the favorites of the court in any actions wherein the infants are involved. The next friend, being
under no bond, can accept no money belonging to the infant.
Where the infant, acting through his proper guardian, repudiates such a compromise, the payor has no other recourse
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except to treat the settlement as void and bring action against
the party or parties receiving the funds so paid in settlement,
and this action will be instituted against the attorney for the
next friend so receiving the funds.
An action may -be brought for an infant by his next friend,
and in this case the father acting as such, properly brought the
action.
In the case of Isaacs v. Boyd, 5 Port. (Ala.) 388, the court
says that a father, as natural guardian of his infant child, can
neither release nor compromise a suit prosecuted by him on behalf of such child, because 'he can do nothing which may operate
to its injury, though he may prosecute a right for its benefit.
The court holds, in Marion v. Ohio Valley By. Co., 99 Ky.
504, that the statutory guardian may compromise an action on
the part of an infant under See. 2030, Ky. Statutes, Ace. N. Y.
& N. J. Mie. Iowa. Hayes v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 18
N. E. (Ill.) 322. In the case of Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lasca,
79 Kan. 311, the court says that a parent is not authorized to
compromise or settle a minor's cause of action for personal injuries, 170 Ill. 610, nor can he, as next friend, surrender the
substantial rights of an infant, Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U S.
650. The next friend may, however, if intrusted with the rights
of the infant, in the cause and acting under authority of the
court, negotiate for a fair settlement of the cause, Walsh v.
Walsh, 116 Mass. 377, but this will not bind the infant. The
infant can only be bound by due judicial sanction Tripp v. Gifford, 155 Mass. 108, Acc. Tenessee Coal Co. v. Hayes, 97 Ala.
201. Ambrose v. Graziani,197 Ky. 679. Feb. 13, 1923. J. S. C.
IxTEREST-TImE OF COMPUTATION.In an action on a promissory note, the verdict of the jury was for the plaintiff, for
the amount set out in the face of the note. The amount of interest was not an issue. The lower court allowed interest from
the maturity of the note. The defendant contended that interest should be allowed only from the date of the judgment.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment allowing interest
from the date of maturity.
The holding 'of the court, in the present case, that interest
should be -allowed on a promissory note from the date of maturity, seems to be consistent with the various jurisdictions of
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this country. Knowles v. Bolwin, 125 Gal. 224; Burke v. Claughton, 12 App. D. C.; Ky. Title Co. v. English, 20 Ky. L. R. 2024;
Gage v. McSweeney, 74 Vt. 370; Conway v. City of Chicago, 237
I1l. 128; Anderson v. Griffith; 51 Or. 116; Runyan v. Runyan,
126 N. E. 35; Graj v. Bekins, 199 Pac. 767; The Muskegon, 278
Fed. 565. For other cases in point see Dec. Dig., Interest, Sec.
45. The general rule seems to be that the legal rate of interest
may be recovered from the maturity of the note. Hack et al. v.
Lashley, 197 Ky. 117. 1922.
0. W. C.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-STREETS--ADVERSE

POSSESSION.

-If a municipality seeks injunctive relief against a person for
erecting buildings over or upon its lassways and such person
relies upon adverse possession as a defense and the municipality
shows by -itsrecords that the passway once belonged to the city,
the adverse claimant must not only show that 'he has been in the
actual possession of the property for the statutory period, but
that he had given to the city written.notices as provided in section 2546 Kentucky Statutes, that he intended to hold such property adversely.
The question involved in this -case is whether or not title by
adverse possession may be acquired in property held by a municipal corporation for a public use. In regard to this question
there is a pronounced conflict of opinion. According to one
line f cases the maxim nullum tempus accurrit regi has no application to nunicipal corporations and title by adverse possion may be acquired to lands 'held by them for a public use,
such as streets, alleys and public squares. Derby v. Alling, 40
Counn. 410; Flynn v. Detroit,93 Mich. 590; St. Paul, etc., B. Co.
v. Minneapolis, 45 Minn. 400; St. Charles County v. Powell, 22
Mp. 525; Lewis v. Baker, 39 Neb. 636; Cincinnati v. Evans, 5
Ohio St. 549; Ostrom v. San Antonio, 77 Tex. 345. Before the
act of 1873, declaring that no adverse holding should begin
against a municipal corporation until the occupant notified the
city of -his purpose to hold against the city, the rule in Kentucky was in accord with the above cases and a municipal corporation could be barred from recovering the same as an individual.
Roman v. Partland, 8 B. Mon. 232; Dudley v. Frankfort
Trustees, 12 B. Mon., 610; Covington v. McNickle, 18 B. Mon.,
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262. But this rule was changed by the act of 1873. Terrell v.
Bloomfield, 2 S. W. 1041 and the case under discussion, City of
Princeton v. Poole, 197 Ky. 248.
The preponderance of authority supports the view that the
maxim nzullum te.mus accurrit regi applies not only to the sovereign but also to municipal corporations, and that title to lands
held by a public corporation for a public use cannot be acquired
by adverse possession. Horn v. Dadeville, 100 Ala. 199; Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Gal. 160; Sullivan v.
Tichenor, 179 Ill. 97; Wolfe v. Sullivan, 133 Ind 331; Waterloo
v. Union Mill Co., 72 Ia. 437; Shehan v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann.
630; Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59 Mliss. 563; Territory v. Deegan,
3. Mont. 83; State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L. 198; Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51; Commonwealth v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. St.
344; Chafe v. Aiken, 57 S. 0. 5071; Sims v. Chattanooga,2 Lea.
(Tenn.) 694; Yates v. Warrenton, 84 Va. 337; Ralston v. Wision, 46 W. Va. 544; Childs v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 125: Simplot v.
Chicago, etc:, R. Co., 5 McCreary (U. S.) 158. This rule seems
to be upon the ground that municipal corporations are trustees
of the rights of the public. It is supported by the weight of
authority and perhaps of reason. City of Princeton v. Poole
J. L. H.
et al., 197 Ky. 248. 1923.
STREET RAILROADS--CoLLISION

WITH

AUTOmOBILES-LAST

CLUR CHANCE.-In a collision between a street car and an

auto-

mobile at a much used crossing, there was evidence of negligence
on both sides. It was held not to .be error to qualify instructions
on contributory negligence by authorizing a recovery on the
"last clear chance" doctrine, where there was evidence that the
motorman did not try to stop the car until after the collision,
although he discovered the danger seventy-five feet below the
point of collision.
This case involves the doctrine of the- "last clear chance,"
the origin of which is generally attributed to the case of Davis
v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. 546, where the owner of -a donkey, who
negligently turned it out upon the highway with its feet fettered, was allowed, regardless of his negligence, to recover from
a person along the highway, who carelessly ran into and killed
the donkey. The ground of the decision and the theory of the
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doctrine is that the party who last has a clear opportunity of
avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for the injury.
The negligence of the defendant, if it intervenes or continues between the negligence of the plaintiff or deceased and the
accident, is regarded as the sole, proximate cause of the injury,
and the plaintiff's antecedent negligence merely as a condition
or remote cause.
In regard to injuries and cases where the negligence of the
plaintiff and the defendant are concurrent it was held in Butler
v. Rockland I. & C. Street Ry. Co., 58 Atl. 775, that the doctrine
did not apply. There the plaintiff was injured by a collision between the vehicle in which he was riding and a motor car, as he
attempted to cross the track. The court said that, "the language of the doctrine of prior and subsequent negligence (another form of stating the doctrine of the "last clear chance)" implies that the principle is not applicable when the negligence of
the plaintiff and that of defendant are practically simultaneous.
Many cases, in stating, if not in applying the doctrine of "last
clear chance," seem to ignore the question whether the negligence of the plaintiff or deceased and defendant were concurrent. The Missouri Sup. Court in Klockenbrink v. St. Louis &
M. River R. Co., 72 ,S.W. 900, states the rule in that state to be:
"When a defendant sees, or by -the exercise of ordinary care,
can see, the peril of a plaintiff caused by the latter's negligence,
in -time to avoid injuring him, then plaintiff can recover notwithstanding his contributory negligence." This is a correct
statement of the rule, upon the assumption that the plaintiff's
negligence was not concurrent with that of defendant up to the
time of the accident, but culminated and ceased before defendant's negligence.
With the exception of Paducah & M. R. Co. v. Hoeltl, 12
Bush, 41, the courts in Kentucky consistently apply the doctrine
of "last clear chance," although the peril was not actually discovered (but might have been) if a breach of duty -on defendant's part intervened between the plaintiff's negligence and the
accident. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Earl, 94 Ky. 374; Pittsburg C. C. &
St. L. B. Co. v. Lemis, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 957; Cramley v. L. &
N. B. Co., 21 Ky. L. Rep., 1434; Owensboro City B. C. v. Hill,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 1638. In the last case the injuxy took place at

CASE COMMENTS

a street railway crossing and the negligence on the part of the
injured person did not prevent a recovery as it appeared that
the employees of the company discovered or could have discovered the danger and failed to use reasonable efforts to avoid
the injury. Flynn v. Louisville Ry. Co., 110 Ky. 662, and
Floyd v. Paducah Ry. & Light Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep., 2364.
The case under discussion is consistent with the Kentucky
rule regarding the "last clear chance" doctrine. Louisville Ry.
Co. v. Thornberry,Extrx., 197 Ky. 272.
J. L. H.
TAXmTIoN-PLEADING--FRAUDULENT

MIISREPRESENTATION AN

EVIDENCE.-The Commonwealth of Kentucky, through it's revenue collector for the state at large, filed suit in the Fayette
circuit court to vacate a judgment, rendered in that court June,
1916, against the estate of L. V. Harkness, deceased; for taxation
in Fayette county. The county court granted the relief but the
circuit court reversed the decree, from which decision the Commonwealth -appealed to the court of appeals.
At the time of his death the deceased owned property in
New York, Kentucky, and California. He spent his time in the
three states, only a small part, however, being spent in Kentucky. None of his tangible property had ever been assessed
for taxation in this state. The sheriff and county attorney of
Fayette county learned -through a newspaper report of an effort
to collect an inheritance tax by the New York officials. The
county attorney, after filing a suit for taxes for the five years
preceding deceased's death, went to New York to investigate the
matter. The question had been taken up by the surrogate court
of that state. The evidence and all the records tending to prove
the legal domicile of the deceased were investigated. He believed from the records that the deceased would be declared
domiciled in New York. He returned to Kentucky, and after
consulting the attorney general of this state, the governor, the
county judge and the sheriff of Fayette county; an agreed judgment was entered into whereby the assessments for the five
years were made. The New York court later held the deceased
to be a resident of Kentucky. This suit was filed after it was
conceded that the agreed judgment in the Bradley suit was a
bar to a similar suit to assess taxes for period similar to that involved in the Bradley suit.
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The ground of this action is that the agreed judgment in the
first suit was procured by fraud. The following four grounds
of fraud were alleged: (1) Misrepresentations by the administrator of the estate as to the residence of the deceased at the time
of his death. (2) Misrepresentations by the administrator and
the attorney for the estate as to value of -the estate at the time
of the taxing dates set out in the petition. (3) Collusion of the
sheriff and the county attorney with the respresentative of the
estate to effect a settlement and thus obtain large fees for services. (4) Failure of the administrator to disclose the value of the
intangible property, and failure to admit or deny according to
the facts, the allegations of the petitions as to the securities
owned by the deceased at the time of his death and the assessing
dates.
The court laid down a rule as to what constitutes actionable
fraud; and in the light of this rule, the four contentions were
dealt with. The rule is: "Actionable fraud against which a
court will relieve, must be misrepresentation of a material fact,
that the party making -it must have known it to be untrue, that
its purpose was to induce the other party to rely on it and that
they did in fact rely on it."
In regard to the first co-tention the court held that if the
parties representing the estate, did make false representations
regarding the residence of the deceased, that they were not
such as the Commonwealth had a right to rely on. The representatives had not seen the evidence tending to prove the deceased a residence of New York, while the county attorney had.
It was proven that it was not the representations of the representatives of the estate that was relied on, but the opinion of
the county attorney based upon the investigation of the records
he made while in New York, that led him to believe the deceased
a resident of that state. Therefore by the application of the
above stated rule this contention fails.
(2) The evidence fails to show that the representatives
made any actual representations as to the value of the estate.
Both the administrator and the attorney, according to the testimony of the county attorney, disclaimed any knowledge of the
value of the estate. The second contention, therefore, fails, not
only by application of the above stated rule, but -also, on its own
merits.
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(3) It was shown that the sheriff and the county attorney
believed from the facts of the case, that the deceased would
eventually be held a resident of New York; and that any settlement of the Kentucky case -would be "a pick up for the state
and county." Their actions were in good fatih. It is also
shown that the governor of the state, the attorney general, the
judge of the circuit court and other prominent citizens of the
state believed the settlement of the case to be a judicious one.
The contention is also made here that the administrator failed
to list all the property of the estate. The county attorney knew
the value of the estate. Therefore the state can not rely on
false representations as actionable fraud, when by the exercise
of due diligence it could have ascertained the true facts.
(4) The state contends that it was the duty of the administrator to admit or deny the statements on the assessing dates and
failure to do so -amounts to actionable fraud. The rule has been
established in this state "an administrator in his answer must
truthfully answer, if he can, but no more; if the facts are presumably in his knowledge, he must admit or deny." The evidence showed -thatthe administrator did not have information
sufficient to form a belief as to whether or not, the securities set
out in the assessment were owned' by the estate. The answer
-which the administrator made amounted to nothing in law. The
Commomyealth still had a right to prove their allegations. One
can not rely on that which in law amounts to nothing. This
answer did n~t induce the settlement. Therefore, by application of the fraud rule, this contention fails.
The rule of law followed in this case is in perfect harmony
with the law of the other states, as well as of England. All the
courts seem to lay down the same rule as to what would establish actionable fraud. Higgins v. Samuels, 2 Johns & H. 460
Chan. 1862. Cox v. Middleton, 2 Drew 209 Chan. 1854, Arons
Reefs limited v. Triss, House of Lords 1896, App. Cas. 273
Brown v. Smith, et al., 89 N. W. 1097, Holmes Appeal, 77 Pa. 50,
Memphis Keeley Institute v. Lewlie. R. Keeley Co., 155 Fed. 964,
Livermore v. Middlesborough Town Land Co., 106 Ky. 140, Taylor v. Midlens, 151 Ky. 957, Hoffnan v. Friedman, et al., 171
Ky. 317, Hicks v. Wallace, 190 Ky. 287, Commonweal.th v.
Harkness, Admr., et al., 197 Ky. 208. Decided Jan. 12, 1923.
R. 0. S.
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TRUsT-TRUST Fop SUPPORT OF A DOG--NAMING TRUSTEE.Testatrix, by one provision in her will, gave $1,000.00 which
was to be used for the support of her dog "Dick," and if the interest was not sufficient for him to be kept in comfort, that is
being well fed, have a bed in the house by a fire and treated well
every day, that the principal be used to such a sum so it will last
his lifetime.
It was -insisted by the heirs-at-law, that the bequest for the
support of the dog "Dick" must fail because (1) there was no
trustee named, and (2) a dog cannot take as a devisee under our
law. Held, in answer to the first question, that equity never
allows a trust to fail for want -of a trustee. The court can and
should appoint a trustee to take the trust created in favor of the
dog. Kentucky Statutes, section 318, Green v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 134 Ky. 311; Rothe v. George, 93 Ky. 609. In answer to
the second question the court held that it was not a devise to
the dog "Dick" but it was a trust created for his use and benefit and is not contrary to law, but is allowable under the Kentucky Statutes, section 317, where it is provided that gifts may
be made for charitable or humane purposes.
The answer to the first question, that equity never allows a
trust to fail for want of a trustee, is a well established principle
of law, in this country and England.
There are very few cases to be found, where a bequest was
made for the use and benefit of animals. An animal cannot be
a devisee, but a trust may be created for the support and maintenance of the alimal. This principle has been recognized in
England. In the case of Tn re Dean. Cooper..Dean v. Stevens,
41 Chancery Division 552, 1889, the testator among other
things, gave to his trustees his eight horses and ponies and also
his hounds. And he charged his freehold estate thereinbefore
devised with the payment, for the term -of fifty years commencing from his death, if any of the said horses and hounds should
so long live, or -an annual sum of £750. And he declared that his
trustees should apply the said annual sum in the maintenance of
the horses and hounds for the time being living, and in maintaining the stables, kennels and buildings inhabited by the said animals in such condition of repair -as his trustees might deem fit.
Held, that the £750 annuity was not given to the trustee beneficially, but that a trust was created for the maintenance of the
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animals, and that such a trust was valid, although it was not a
charity, and its execution could not be enforced by any one.
Also that the surplus of the £750 not employed in the maintenance of the animals belonged either to the devisee of the freehold
estate or to the testator's heir-at-law. In Ford v. Ford, 91 Ky.
572, it was held, that our satute is a substantial re-enactment
of 43 Elizabeth and should receive a construction similar to that
given the English Statute. A devise will be upheld, not only
when it is given for the charitable purposes specifically named
in the statute but when for such other "charitable or humane"
purposes as are kindred to those named. For other cases in
point, see Dec. Dig., charities, sec. 10.
The general rule seems to be, that a bequest for the support
and maintenance of animals, will be considered as a valid trust,
and in absence of a trustee, a court of equity will appoint one
to carry out the trust. Willett v. Wille.tt, 197 Ky. 663. 1923.
0. W. C.
TRUSTS-GIFTS OF PERSONL PROPERTY.-Joint money of
Haynes and his wife, was deposited 'by agreement between the
parties, in the name of the wife, to remain in the bank until the
death of one of them and then to go to the survivor. It could not
be checked on by either party without the consent of both. At the
instance of the parties these words were written on the deposit
book: "To go to F. M. Haynes at my death."
Later Mrs.
Haynes drew a cheek for the entire amount in favor of the defendant and endorsed these words on the check :" I hereby annull
the instruction given to the bank to pay my balance to F. M.
Raynes at my death." Upon the bank's refusal to pay without
the consent of Haynes the account was transferred to defendant's name but with the understanding that it could not be
checked on without the consent of Haynes. Mrs. Haynes died
some years later. Haynes sued for the ambunt of the fund deposited.
The doctrine of parol trusts, especially in relation to personal property, hs a permanent and fixed place in the law, and
such a trust will be created 'and enforced. Wiliamson v. Yeage.r,
91 Ky. 282. The declarant or donor of the trust may constitute
himself the trustee or 'he need not name 'a trustee, but in order to
do this, it is necessary for the donor to clearly and unequivocally
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declare .thathe henceforth holds the property as trust for the
donee. This declaration may be made either by action or wordof-mouth.
When this trust is clearly created by the donor,
equity will uphold it, and treat the gift as executed. Roche v.
George, 93 Ky. 609; KrankeZl v. Krankell, 104 Ky. 745; Sherley
v. Sherley, 97 Ky. 512.
In order to determine whether a deposit in a bank by one
person in favor of another is a trust or not, particular attention
must be given to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. While entitled to some consideration, the mere form of
the deposit is not controlling or conclusive, but the court will in
all circumstances look at the surrounding facts, together with
the declarations and acts of the depositor, in order to determine,
as a question of fact, whether he intended to create a trust.
Meislha v. Meislahn, 56 N. Y. App. Div. 566; Kelley v. Snow,
185 Mass. 288; Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. St. 235.
In deciding this case the court said: "There is no testimony to the contrary and we do not entertain the slightest doubt
but that these two old people agreed between themselves that
they Would deposit that account in the bank as their joint trustee with the declared trust that it should go to the survivor, but
reserving the right to consume it before the time for the trust
to take effect, with their joint consent. No such consent was
ever given, and under the very terms of the deposit the plaintiff
was entitled to the fund upon the death of his wife.. Judgment
of the lower court in favor of -the plaintiff is affirmed. Murphy,
et al. v. Haynes, 197 Ky. 444. January 26, 1923.
T. E. S.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-POWERS OF THE WmDE TO SELL
PRoPmaTY.-Where the testator wills all his property to his wife
for life, to sell to reinvest for the benefit of herself and children,
as she should think necessary; held, the wife may sell the property both real and personal or any part thereof, but this is
restricted to sales for the benefit of herself and children and
she has absolute discretion in disposing of the property for this
purpose.
The wife is restricted in such a ease, to sales for the benefit
of herself and children and has no power to dispose of the property otherwise. The wife has absolute power to sell but must reinvest the proceeds for the benefit of herself and children and
any other investment is beyond the power granted by the will.
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The ease of Markille v. Ragland, 77 Ill. 98, holds that, where
the wife was given -the property by will, with power uncondi.tional to convey by deed, the wife could give good title. In
Chase v. Ladd, 26 N. E. 429 (Mass.) the court holds that, where
the will devises property to the wife "to her use with power to
sell for her support," the wife has power to convey a fee only
for such purposes, but where she is given full power to sell then
she may give a fee in any event at her discretion, 26 N. E. 427
(Mass.) The court, in Smith v. Beardsley, 51 Fed. 122, holds
that a bequest of all property to the wife for life, with provision
that a sufficient portion be appropriated to the children for their
support, the widow may sell the personal property for such purpose. The Indiana court, in Wood v. Robertson, 113 Ind. 323,
held the wife had only a life estate with limited power of disposition, where the will provided -the wife could sell realty for
the maintenance of herself and children. The widow was given
a life estate with power to provide for herself and children out
of the property and estate in case of necessity and the court
held an implied power was given the wife to convey title. In
Re Ortle, 34 Minn. 173. The court, in the case of Orr v.
o'Brien, 55 Tex. 149, held that, where the will gave an estate to
the wife for life, with power to dispose of enough to maintain
herself and children, .the wife could convey a fee. In the case
of Swarthout v. Rassier, 143 N. Y. 499, the testator gave property to his wife for life and if necessary for her maintenance, to
sell enough of the corpus for that purpose, the court held that
the widow had a right to convey a fee in that property necessary
to be sold for her support.
All the courts hold that such a right must be taken from the
express words of the testator coupled with the intention of the
testator as deducted from the entire instrument and the courts
will not freely construe such a right. The life estate created in
the wife is guarded closely. No implied right to convey a fee
will be construed from the will in favor of the wife, and in this
respect Kentucky does not go beyond the settled rules of construction. Miller v. Miller, 197 Ky. 753. Feb. 16, 1923.
J. S. C.
WILLS-INTENT-CoNDIION

PRECED

-- ]DXECUTORY

DF-

viss.-Where a will devising realty to two heirs provides that
one shall hold the devise of -the other in trust for a certain period,
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until the cestui qui trust performs certain conditions to the satisfaction of the -trustees; the court held this a condition precedent,
a lawful disposition of the property, and the vesting of the estate
in the cestui qui trust postponed for that period provided in
the will, and as much longer as the discretion of the trustee
should dictate; further, that the trust cannot be terminated
within the period fixed by the will.
It follows then, that any conveyance of the estate in the
meantime, even though sanctioned by the trustee, is not a binding sale, and the cestui qui trust, not having a fee simple, specific performance of such a sale will not be enforced.
The signing of the deed by the trustee, in a joint transfer
of land where he holds in trust upon a condition precedent, does
not mean that the condition precedent has been fulfilled.
A condition precedent requires the performance of the condition before property will pass, and this must be a strict and
literal compliance with the condition precedent. I. Roper on
Legacies, Ch. 13, pp. 750-769; 2 Redfield on Wills, 662; Page v.
Frazicr'sExecutor, 77 Ky. 205.
The case of West v. Moore, 37 Miss. 114, holds that where
the testator willed property to his children, one of whom should
not take until reformed, -and if he did reform before he became
24 he would take, held that his reforming before he became
twenty-four was a condition precedent and if not complied with,
he could not take under the will.
Again in the case of Donohue v. McNichol, the testatrix
willed certain realty to her son upon condition that he lead a
sober life, held this is a condition precedent and upon his failure
to comply with the provisions, the estate vested in other heirs,
and in no event could he take before compliance in every way.
Where the testaor devised property to his niece provided
she live with his widow, the eondition was held to be precedent
and must be fully performed before title to the estate -passed.
The fact that the widow was unendurable was no excuse. Schuman v. Heldman, 63 S. C. 474. The cases of Drayton v. Grinke,
Rich. Eq. Cas. 321 and Gaff v. Peisenhafer,190-Ill. 200, are in
accord. In the case of Robinson v. Wheelwright, 6 De G.. b. & G.
535, -a devise given upon condition must be strictly complied with
under the intention of the will, and the courts, although finding
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from all circumstances, what the intent is, cannot interfere to
bring about a fulfillment of the condition. Accord Pulteney v.
Lord Darlington, Fonblanque's Eq., 5th Ed. Vol. 2, page 328,
and Roundel v. Currer,2 Bro. Rep. 67.
In Kentucky, as is the prevailing rule, the intention as
disclosed by the entire instrument of the testator governs. No
technical rule of construction will be permitted to defeat it. 196
Ky. 750, Greenway v. White. The intention of the testator s
taken from the language he employed in the entire instrument,
which construction must not contravene any positive rule of
law or public policy. According to 170 Ky. 464 the intention of
the testator prevails if not contrary to the established rules of
law. Rules of construction will not defeat the plain intent of
the testator where all attending circumstances are taken into
consideration.
In Floyd v. Smith, 59 Fla. 485 the court held that the intention of the testator prevails over all other considerations if
consistent with the principle of law. The case of Ludon v.
Campbell, 204 Mass. 580 holds that the intention of the testator
prevails if clear and not contrary to law. Accord, N. Y., Ill.,
Mich., Pa., Ohio. The case of Gorringe v. Mahlstedt (1917), A.
C. 225 shows the English rules to concur with the cases cited.
In the case under review, the only question of public policy
or -act contrary to established principles of law, is the proviso
disposing of property by an executory devise. But such a disposition is lawful in -the case of a will In fact an exedutory
devise is created only by will, BurleiglL v. Clough, 52 N. H. 257,
and is a disposition whereby no estate vests at the testator's
death, but only at the happening of some contingency subject
always to the rule of perpetuities.
The executory devise differs from a remainder in (1) that
it needs no particular estate to support it (Ibid.) ; (2) that by it
a fee simple-or less title may be limited after a fee simple, Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229, and (3) that by this means, a remainder of u chattel interest may be limited after a particular
estate for life created in the same. Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H.
257, 2 Blackstone 173, Muir's Exr. v. Howard, 178 Ky. 51.
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In case of death, as in the case of Wealey v. Blackner, 51
Ky. 457, where the devise was executory on condition of the
devisee's reforming, his death terminated the trust and vested
the property is his heirs.
This sale of land, attempted to be executed before the condition precedent was fulfilled, -and in the life time of the devisee,
was therefore void. Barrett v. Percival, 197 Ky. 88. Dec. 15,
J. S.C.
1922.
WRIT O PROHIBITION, JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE.

-The petitioners instituted this action in the Court of Appeals
against R. C. Stoll, judge of -the Fayette Circuit Court and W.
W. Williams, judge of the Knott County Circuit Court; to stop
proceedings on a warrant issued in Fayette county, and an indictment of the same court.
In July of 1921, Green Watkins and Henry Noble were
Watkins died there
mortally wounded in Knott county.
but Noble was taken to Lexington where he died. A warrant
was issued from Fayette county and placed in the hands of the
sheriff of Knott county, for the arrest of the petitioners on the
charge of the murder of Noble. The wounding of Noble occurred
at a place in Knott county near the Breathitt county line.
The circuit court of Knott county was about to convene and
friends of the petitioners visited the commonwealth attorney of
Knott county, asking that the petitioners be indicted in that
court, and agreeing to surrender them if he would have them indicted there. A warrant having been issued from Breathitt
county and fearing violence if he was executed, the commonwealth attorney agreed to have them indicted in Knott court.
Friends of the petitioners assisted in procuring an indictment
in Knott county. Before the return of the indictment the sheriff
of Knott county arrested petitioner, having in his possession at
the time of the arrest warrants from the counties of Fayette,
Knott and Breathitt. The Knott county warrant was procured
by the sheriff, from the county judge of Knott county, while
enroute to the place where the friends of the accused designated
as the place of surrender. Petitioners were lodged in the Knott
county jail where the indictments were served on them. Fayette
county had in the meantime indieted -them for the murder of
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Noble. The indictment of the Knott county court was quashed
and they were reindicted for the murder of Watkins but not
Noble as the commonwealth attorney believed that for this
crime the court of Fayette county had jurisdiction.
The petitioners brought habeas corpus proceedings in the
Knott county court to prevent the execution of the Fayette
county warrant and the taking of them to Fayette county. The
Judge refused the writ but granted them bond for their appearance in the Fayette county court.
The question that -is presented to the court is: Does the
Fayette county court, in view of these facts and circumstances
have jurisdiction? Section 1147 of the Kentucky Statutes provides: "If -a mortal wound or other violence or injury be inflicted, or poison administered in one county and death ensues
in another county, the offense may be prosecuted in either
county." Section 21 of the Criminal Code -provides: "If an offense be partly committed in one county and partly in another
or if acts constituting an offense occur in different counties, the
Section 24, of the code projurisdiction is in either county."
vides: "If the jurisdiction of an offense be in two or more counties, the defendant will be tried in the county in which he is first
arrested, uless an indictment for the offense be pending in another county." Under the section of the statute cited the court
held that jurisdiction of the offense existed in the county where
the mortal wound was inflicted and also in the county where
death ensued. Under the code provisions above referred to, if an
indictment -be pending in either of the counties having jurisdiction, before the offender is arrested upon the charge in the other
county, exclusive jurisdiction attaches to the court of the county
in which proceedings were first instituted regardless of where
the offender may have been arrested.
Fayette county was the first to issue a warrant, now if the
issuance of the warrant and the placing of -it in the hands of the
sheriff of Knott county, gave to Fayette county precedence in
the prosecution of the offence; then the proceedings in the Knott
county court would not defeat the jurisdiction, already fixed.
This was held especially true and applicable if the commonwealth attorney quashed the indictment in Knott county and
failed to return another, believing the jurisdiction to be in
Fayette county.
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The holding in the case of Speicer v. Commonwealtb, 194
Ky. 699, was held by the court as being applicable to this case.
It was held in that case that if before an indictment was returned, an officer having in his possession warrants for the arrest
of a person from two or more counties having jurisdiction,
should issue the process which was issued first or the one -that
first came to his hands. The officer can not disregard the warrant and arrest as if he had none, and, by so doing establish
jurisdiction in the county where the arrest was made and defeat
jurisdiction in the county from which a warrant was first issued, applying this holding to this case we have the sheriff of
Knott county arresting on a warrant issued from Knott county,
after he had in his possession a warrant issued from Fayette
county. Therefore he could not elect to serve the Knott county
warrant and fix jurisdiction in that county, and defeat jurisdiction and the precedence to which the warrant from Fayette
county was entitled.
Clemons, et al. v. R. C. Stoll, judge of the Fayette circuit
court, and W. W. Williams, judge of the Knott circuit court.
R.O.S.
Decided Jan. 12, 1923.

